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Abstract
We study herd behavior in a laboratory ￿nancial market with ￿-
nancial market professionals. An important novelty of the experi-
mental design is the use of a strategy-like method. This allows us
to detect herd behavior directly by observing subjects￿decisions for
all realizations of their private signal. In the paper, we compare two
treatments: one in which the price adjusts to the order ￿ ow in such a
way that herding should never occur, and one in which the presence
of event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the ￿rst treatment,
traders herd seldom, in accordance with both the theory and previous
experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of traders,
however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the
theory. In the second treatment, on the one hand, the proportion of
herding decisions increases, but not as much as the theory would sug-
gest; on the other hand, contrarianism disappears altogether. In both
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1treatments, in contrast with what theory predicts, subjects sometimes
prefer to abstain from trading, which a⁄ects the process of price dis-
covery negatively.
21. Introduction
In recent years, there has been much interest, both theoretical and em-
pirical, on the extent to which trading in ￿nancial markets is characterized
by herd behavior. Such an interest stems from the e⁄ects that herding may
have on ￿nancial markets￿stability and ability to achieve allocative and in-
formational e¢ ciency.
The theoretical literature has tried to identify the mechanisms that lead
traders to herd (for surveys, see, e.g., Gale, 1996; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003;
Chamley, 2004; Vives, 2007). The theoretical contributions have emphasized
that, in ￿nancial markets, the fact that prices adjust to the order ￿ ow makes
it more di¢ cult for herding to arise than in other setups, such as those
studied in the social learning literature, where there is no price mechanism.
Nevertheless, it is possible that rational traders herd, e.g., because there are
di⁄erent sources of uncertainty in the market.
To test herding models directly with data from actual ￿nancial markets is
di¢ cult. In order to test for herd behavior one needs to detect whether agents
choose the same action independently of their private information.1 The
problem for the empiricist is that there are no data on the private information
available to the traders. So, it is di¢ cult to determine whether traders make
similar decisions because they disregard their own information and imitate
or because they are reacting to the same piece of public information, for
instance.2
To overcome this problem some authors (Cipriani and Guarino, 2005;
Drehman et al., 2005) have tested herd behavior in a laboratory ￿nancial
market. In the laboratory, participants receive private information on the
value of a security and observe the decisions of other subjects. Given these
two pieces of information, they choose sequentially if they want to sell, to
buy or not to trade a security with a market maker. In the laboratory one
can observe the private information that subjects have when making their
decisions, so it is possible to test models of herding directly.
1Here we only discuss herding informally. In the next section we will give a formal
de￿nition.
2A series of empirical papers have documented the presence of herding in ￿nancial
markets and have tried to identify its sources (see, e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt
et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004). Almost all the existing empirical literature does
not test the theoretical models of herding directly; an exception is a recent paper by
Cipriani and Guarino (2006) that estimates a structural model of informational herding.
3Our paper contributes to the existing experimental literature on herd
behavior in ￿nancial markets by innovating in three signi￿cant aspects:
￿ Our sample consists of ￿nancial market professionals. The existing
experimental studies on herding in ￿nancial markets use college under-
graduates as subjects. As a result, one may wonder how representative
these laboratory experiments are of the behavior of professionals oper-
ating in actual ￿nancial markets. The external validity of experimen-
tal studies is, indeed, a well known concern in the literature. In our
speci￿c case, one may imagine that professional behavior in the ￿eld
might di⁄er from students￿behavior in the laboratory because of the
professionals￿di⁄erent ages, levels of education and training. Moreover,
professional expertise, developed by working daily in ￿nancial markets,
may lead to the development of trading heuristics that are di⁄erent
from those used by non-￿nancial professionals.
￿ The existing literature has tested for the presence of herding in a market
where, according to the theory, herding should never arise. In contrast,
we compare two treatments: one (from now on Treatment I) in which,
as in the previous experimental work, subjects should always use their
private information and never herd; the other (from now on Treatment
II) where, instead, herding becomes optimal because of event uncer-
tainty, i.e., uncertainty about the presence of informed traders in the
market. The economy studied in Treatment II has never been analyzed
experimentally (not even with a more standard pool of participants),
although event uncertainty is recognized in the theoretical literature as
one of the main channels of herding in ￿nancial markets (Avery and
Zemsky, 1998).
￿ We ran the experiment using a strategy method-like procedure that al-
lowed us to detect herding behavior directly (whereas in previous work
it could only be inferred indirectly). In particular, in previous exper-
imental work subjects were asked to trade in sequence, one by one;
each subject received a private signal and then made a decision. In
contrast, in our experiment all subjects who have not yet traded make
their decisions conditional on all signal realizations; only after choos-
ing their strategies is one subject randomly chosen to trade and his
strategy implemented for the realized signal value. This is a signi￿cant
4procedural novelty in the experimental literature on herding and infor-
mational cascades: since each subject makes a decision for each signal
realization, we can observe directly whether and when he chooses the
same action irrespective of his private information. Moreover, since in
each period of trading all subjects who have not yet traded are asked
to make a decision for each signal, our dataset is much larger than it
would have been in the earlier experimental designs. This was par-
ticularly important given the di¢ culty of recruiting ￿nancial market
professionals.
The results of our experiment show that, as theory suggests, the propor-
tion of herding decisions is very low in Treatment I. Therefore, the theoret-
ical prediction that price adjustment to the order ￿ ow reduces the scope for
herding behavior is con￿rmed by the experimental data on ￿nancial market
professionals. Moreover, also in accordance with the theory, herding increases
in Treatment II, where the price adjustment rule is consistent with the pres-
ence of event uncertainty. Nevertheless, some important anomalies do occur
in the laboratory. First, in Treatment I, some subjects engage in contrarian-
ism, something not predicted by the theory. These subjects go against the
market, selling (regardless of the private signal) when the price is high, and
buying (regardless of the private signal) when it is low. Moreover, in the sec-
ond treatment, herd behavior is lower than theory predicts. Finally, in both
treatments, subjects have a tendency to abstain from trading, which is not
predicted by the theory. Abstention from trading implies that the market is
unable to infer the subjects￿private signals, which lowers the informational
e¢ ciency of the market.
It is worth noting that our results in Treatment I are similar to those
obtained by previous experimental work using student subjects. In both
samples, the proportion of herding is low, as the theory predicts; moreover,
subjects in both samples share the propensity to act as contrarians and to
abstain from trading more than is predicted by the theory. This reassures the
reader of the validity of previous experimental work that relies on students
subjects.
Before moving to the main analysis, we now provide a brief literature
review.
1.1 Literature Review
Our paper is related to the theoretical literature on herd behavior in
￿nancial markets. In particular, our experimental setup is based on the
5analysis of Avery and Zemsky (1998). They show that, in a sequential trading
model ￿ Glosten and Milgrom, where the price is correctly set by a market
maker according to the order ￿ ow, traders never herd. Herding, however,
arises if there is uncertainty not only regarding the fundamental value of
the asset but also regarding other characteristics of the market, such as the
proportion of informed traders in the market (event uncertainty). Park and
Sabourian (2006) have recently revisited Avery and Zemsky (1998)￿ s model
and provided di⁄erent conditions on the signal structure under which herd
behavior can arise. Other scholars have shown that informational cascades
and herding in ￿nancial markets occur when traders have informational and
non-informational (e.g., liquidity or hedging) motives to trade (Cipriani and
Guarino, 2001), or when trading activity is a⁄ected by reputation concerns
(Dasgupta and Pratt, 2005).
Our work belongs to the experimental literature on herding in ￿nancial
markets. We have already mentioned that Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and
Drehman et al. (2005) have tested for herd behavior in ￿nancial markets
using student subjects. One of the purposes of our paper is to compare the
behavior of ￿nancial market professionals with that of students. In Section 5
we will discuss in detail how our results compare with those of these papers.
Cipriani and Guarino (2008) have showed that informational cascades form
in a laboratory ￿nancial market in the presence of transaction costs. Since
there are no transaction costs in the experiment described here, this type of
cascade cannot arise.
Finally, our paper is also close in spirit to Alevy et al. (2007). Like us,
they use ￿nancial professionals in their experimental study.3 In contrast to
our study, however, they test a standard informational cascade game based on
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and not a model of trading in ￿nancial markets.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical model and its predictions. Section 3 presents the experimental
design. Section 4 illustrates the main results. Section 5 compares them
with the results in the existing experimental literature. Section 6 discusses
3Note that Drehman et al. (2005) study herding behavior in ￿nancial markets using
both a sample of students and a sample of professionals. Professionals in their sample,
however, are not ￿nancial market professionals, and, as a result, the same limitation as in
the analysis with students apply.
4Other experimental studies on non-￿nancial herding and cascades, based on the
Bickchandani et al. (1992), include Anderson and Holt, 1997; ˙elen and Kariv, 2004;
Goeree et al. (2007); Huck and Oechssler, 2000; and K￿bler and Weiszs￿cker, 2004.
6individual behavior. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Theoretical model
2.1. The model structure
As we mentioned in the introduction, our experimental analysis is based
on the theoretical model of Avery and Zemsky (1998), who analyze herd
behavior in an economy similar to that of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
Easley and O￿ Hara (1987). In contrast to these papers, however, we assume
that the market maker can post only one price, i.e., it is not allowed to post
di⁄erent prices at which traders can buy (the ask price) or sell (the bid price).
We adopt this assumption to simplify the implementation of the trading game
in the laboratory. All the results that we present in this theoretical section
hold independently of whether the market maker is allowed to post a bid-ask
spread.
In our market there is one asset traded by a sequence of traders who
interact with a market maker. Time is represented by a countable set of
trading periods, indexed by t = 1;2;3:::. Traders act in an exogenously
determined sequential order. Each trader, indexed by t, is chosen to take an
action only once, at time t.
The asset value
The fundamental value of the asset is a discrete random variable v. An
information event occurs with probability p;5 in this case, the asset value
takes the values 0 and 100 with probability 1
2. In contrast, with probability
(1￿p), there is no information event and v takes value 50. This assumption
is meant to capture the idea that, during a day of trading, information may
arrive in the market which pushes the fundamental value of the asset up or
down; in contrast, in the case of no event, the asset value remains at its
unconditional expected value.
The market
At each time t, a trader can exchange the asset with a market maker.
The trader can buy, sell or decide not to trade. Each trade consists of the
exchange of one unit of the asset for cash. We denote the action of the trader
at time t by xt and denote the history of trades and prices up to time t ￿ 1
by ht.
The market maker
5The event is called ￿informational￿since￿as we shall see￿when it occurs, some traders
receive private information on it.
7At any time t, the market maker sets the price at which a trader can buy
or sell the asset. The market maker is only allowed to set one price (i.e., we
do not allow for a bid-ask spread). He sets the price equal to the expected
value conditional on the public information available at time t, i.e.,6
pt = E(vjht).
The traders
Traders are of two types, noise traders and informed traders. If the value
of the asset is 50 (i.e., there is no information event), there are only noise
traders in the market. Noise traders act for ￿liquidity￿or other exogenous
reasons, buying, selling or not trading with exogenously given probabilities.
If, instead, an information event occurs and the value of the asset is either 0
or 100, at each time t the trader acting in the market is an informed trader
with probability ￿ and a noise trader with probability 1￿￿. Informed traders
receive private information on the realization of the asset value. In particular,
if at time t an informed trader is chosen to trade, he observes a symmetric
binary signal on the realization of v with distribution
Pr(st = 100jv = 100) = Pr(st = 0jv = 0) = 0:7.
In addition to his signal, an informed trader at time t observes the history
of trades and prices and the current price. Therefore, his expected value of





v ￿ pt if xt = buy,
0 if xt = no trade,
pt ￿ v if xt = sell,
:
Informed traders are risk neutral and choose xt to maximize E(U(v;xt;pt)jht;st).
Therefore, they ￿nd it optimal to buy whenever E(vjht;st) > pt and sell
whenever E(vjht;st) < pt. They are indi⁄erent among buying, no trading
and selling when E(vjht;st) = pt.
6In the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model the market maker posts a bid
price and an ask price and makes zero expected pro￿ts because of unmodeled potential
competition. As we mentioned, we avoid the presence of two prices (the bid and the ask)
and assume that the market maker sets only one price equal to the expected value of
the asset. By setting one price only, the market maker earns negative expected pro￿ts.
This is not a problem, since in the experiment the market maker is not a subject, but an
automaton.
82.2. Theoretical predictions
We now illustrate the predictions of our model by analyzing two distinct
parameterizations, each corresponding to one of the two treatments that we
ran in the laboratory. In the ￿rst parametrization, we set p = 1, i.e., we
assume that an information event occurs with certainty. In this case we also
assume that ￿ = 1, i.e., that all traders in the market are informed. In the
second parametrization, we set p = 0:15 and ￿ = 0:95, i.e., we assume that
an information event occurs with probability strictly smaller than 1, and
that, if the event occurs, there is a small proportion of noise traders in the
market. Moreover, noise traders abstain from trading with probability 0:33
during an informed day and with probability 0:02 during an uninformed day
and, if they trade, they buy and sell with equal probability.7
To discuss the theoretical predictions of the model, let us ￿rst introduce
the formal de￿nitions of cascade behavior, herd behavior and contrarianism
that we will use in our analysis.
De￿nition 1 An informed trader engages in cascade behavior if he chooses
the same action independently of the private signal. If the chosen action
conforms to the majority of past trades the trader engages in herd behavior.
If the chosen action goes against the majority of past trades the trader engages
in contrarian behavior.
For instance, if a trader buys irrespective of whether he received a signal
0 or 100, we say that he engages in cascade behavior. If the buy order follows
a history in which there are more buy than sell orders, the trader herds.8 If
7This parametrization, with a strictly positive proportion of noise traders and a di⁄erent
probability of no trade by noise traders when there is no information event, makes the
implementation of the model in the laboratory more natural. We will explain this in detail
when we illustrate the experimental procedures.
8It is worth clarifying the relation between the standard de￿nition of herd behavior in
the social learning literature and ours. In this literature (see, e.g., Gale, 1996; Smith and
Słrensen, 2000), a herd is said to occur when a sequence of agents make the same decision
(not necessarily ignoring their private information). Here, instead, we de￿ne herd behavior
as a particular type of cascade behavior. Our departure from the standard de￿ntion is
motivated by the fact that our de￿nition is particularly convenient for the experimental
analysis. In the analysis we elicit subjects￿strategies conditional on the signal realizations,
which is more informative than only observing the actions. Our de￿nition of herding allows
us to study when subjects ignore their private information to conform to the established
pattern of trade.
9instead the buy order follows a history with more sell than buy orders, the
trader acts as a contrarian.
Herding and contrarianism are two particular types of cascade behavior.
Cascade behavior, however, is a more general concept. For instance, a trader
also engages in cascade behavior if he abstains from trading for any realization
of his private signal. When describing the experimental results we will ￿nd
it useful to distinguish between ￿cascade trading behavior￿(when a trader
engaging in cascade behavior either buys or sells) and ￿cascade no-trading
behavior￿(when he instead decides to abstain from trading).
Following Avery and Zemsky (1998), it is easy to show that, in the ￿rst
setup (i.e., when an informational event occurs with probability one), cascade
behavior cannot arise, whereas in the second setup (with event uncertainty)
cascade behavior (and, in particular, herd behavior) arises with positive prob-
ability. In contrast, contrarianism and the other types of cascade behavior
mentioned above never arise in equilibrium. We summarize this in the next
two results:
Result 1 If an informational event occurs with certainty (p = 1), in equilib-
rium traders always trade according to their private signal and never
engage in cascade behavior.
To explain the result, let us recall that, in order to decide whether to buy
or sell the asset, a trader computes its expected value and compares it to the
price. If at time t a trader receives a signal of 100, his expected value is
E(vjht;st = 100) = 100Pr(v = 100jht;st = 100)
= 100
(:7)Pr(v = 100jht)
(:7)Pr(v = 100jht) + (:3)(1 ￿ Pr(v = 100jht))
> 100Pr(v = 100jht) = E(vjht) = pt,
and, therefore, he buys. Similarly, if he receives a signal of 0, his expected
value is lower than the market price and he sells. This shows that an agent
always ￿nds it optimal to trade according to his private information and
cascade behavior cannot arise.
Let us turn now to the case in which p = 0:15, i.e., in which there is
uncertainty about whether or not the value of the asset changed from its
unconditional expectation. In such a case, it can be optimal for agents to
neglect their private information and herd:
10Result 2 In the presence of event uncertainty (p < 1), in equilibrium herd
behavior occurs with positive probability.
Here, we only discuss the intuition for this result and refer the reader to
Cipriani and Guarino (2006) for a formal proof. When an informed trader
receives a private signal, he learns that an event has occurred. Therefore,
when he observes a sequence of trades, he knows that each buy or sell order
comes from an informed trader with probability 0:95. He will update his
belief on the asset value on the basis of this information. The market maker,
by contrast, has a prior belief of 0:86 that the trades just come from noise
traders.9 Therefore, when he receives a buy or a sell order, he updates his
belief (i.e., the price) by less than the traders. As a result, after a sequence
of buy (sell) orders, the expectation of a trader may be higher (lower) than
the price even if he receives a bad (good) signal.
In Figure 1, we show the sequence of expectations and prices after a
series of buy orders. At time 3, the equilibrium price is lower than both
the expectation of a trader receiving a good signal and the expectation of
a trader receiving a bad signal. Therefore, the trader at time 3 will buy
whatever signal he receives, i.e., he will herd.
Note that, since the market maker updates his expectation (and the price)
by less than the informed traders, it will never be the case that, after a history
of buys, the expectation of a trader will be below the price for both signal
realizations. Analogously, after a history of sell orders the expectation of an
informed trader will never be above the price for both signal realizations. As
a result, an informed trader will never engage in contrarian behavior.
The presence of herding in the market is, of course, important for the in-
formational e¢ ciency of prices. During periods of herd behavior, private in-
formation is not e¢ ciently aggregated by the price. In these periods, traders
do not make use of the private information they have and, as a result, the
market cannot learn such information.
Even during a period of herding, although the price does not aggregate
private information e¢ ciently, the market maker does learn something on
the true asset value.10 Indeed, even in a period of herding, he updates his
9The value 0:86 is equal to (1 ￿ p) + p(1 ￿ ￿).
10Therefore, although in our model traders engage in herd behavior (and, hence, in cas-
cade behavior), a blockage of information never occurs. In the social learning literature,
such a blockage of information is called an informational cascade. In most setups, acting
11belief on whether there has been an informational event. For this reason, in
Figure 1 the price keeps moving even after time 3, even though traders are
herding. The market maker observes more and more traders buying the asset
and gives more and more weight to the event that these traders are informed
(noise traders would buy or sell with equal probabilities). Because of this
price movement, herd behavior will eventually disappear. As shown in Figure
1, during a period of herding the traders￿expectations do not move (since
the traders already know that an event has occurred and they also know
that informed traders are herding rather than using their signals). When
the price becomes higher than the expectation conditional on a bad signal,
agents will no longer ￿nd it optimal to herd. On the contrary, they will trade
according to their private information. In our ￿gure, this occurs at time 7.
The model, therefore, explains temporary herd behavior. Clearly, Figure 1 is
just an example: the occurrence and subsequent breaking of herd behavior
depends on the speci￿c sequence of trades.
3. The Experiment and the Experimental Design
3.1. The experiment
We ran the experiment in the Experimental Laboratory of the ELSE
Centre at the Department of Economics at UCL between December 2006
and February 2007. The participants were 32 ￿nancial professionals working
for ￿nancial institutions operating in London. We ran 4 sessions and each
subject participated in exactly one session.11
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The sessions started with written instructions given to
all subjects.12 We explained to participants that they were all receiving
the same instructions. Subjects could ask clarifying questions, which we
answered privately. The experiment consisted of two treatments. The ￿rst
independently of the signal (i.e., engaging in cascade behavior) implies a blockage of in-
formation. This, however, is not true in our setup: with event uncertainty, when informed
traders act independently of their signal, the market maker learns that an informational
event has occurred. For this reason, we prefer not talk of informational cascades in the
paper, and only use the concept of cascade behavior.
11We also conducted a pilot session with 8 more participants. In that session, we used
a di⁄erent payo⁄ function to pay the traders. For this reason, we do not include the data
from the pilot session in the analysis of our results.
12The instructions are available on the journal￿ s and on the au-
thors￿ webpages: http://www.jeea.org; http://home.gwu.edu/~mciprian/;
http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpagu/.
12treatment started with two ￿practice￿rounds, followed by 7 rounds in which
subjects received monetary payments. After completing the ￿rst treatment,
participants received the instructions for the second one. Then they took
part in the second treatment, which consisted again of 7 paid rounds.13
The participants acted as informed traders and could exchange an asset
with a computerized market maker. In both treatments, we implemented
our model conditioning on an information event having occurred. The two
treatments di⁄ered with respect to the price-updating rule used by the market
maker.
Let us now see the procedures for each round of the experiment in detail:
1. At the beginning of each round, the computer program randomly chose
the asset value. The value was equal to 0 or 100 with probability 1
2.
Each random draw was independent.
2. Participants were not told the realization of the asset value. They
knew, however, that they would receive information on the asset value,
in the form of a symmetric binary signal. If the asset value was equal
to 100, a participant would get a ￿white signal￿with probability 0:7
and a ￿blue signal￿with probability 0:3. If the value was equal to 0,
the probabilities would be inverted.14
3. Each round consisted of 8 trading periods. In the ￿rst trading period,
all 8 subjects made two trading decisions, conditional on the two possi-
ble signal realizations. They had to choose whether they would like to
buy or sell one unit of the asset (at the price of 50) or not to trade, both
in the event of receiving a white signal and in the event of receiving a
blue signal. After all 8 participants made their decisions, the computer
program randomly selected one of them (with equal probability) as the
actual trader for that period. That subject received a signal (according
to the rule indicated under point 2) and his decision conditional on the
signal was executed.
4. The other subjects observed on their screens the executed trading de-
cision, as well as the new price for period 2. The identity of the subject
whose decision was executed, however, was not revealed.
13The 7 rounds of the second treatment were not preceded by practice rounds since the
two treatments were very similar.
14That is, the white signal corresponded to st = 100 and the blue signal to st = 0:
135. In the second period, there were 7 subjects whose decisions had not
yet been executed. As in the ￿rst period, they indicated whether they
wanted to buy, sell or not to trade conditional on the white and the
blue signal. Then, one of them was randomly selected, received a signal
and his decision conditional on that signal was executed.
6. The same procedures were repeated for 8 periods, until all subjects had
acted once. Note that all subjects (including those whose decision had
already been executed) observed the trading decisions in each period
and the corresponding price movement. Indeed, the computer program
moved from one period to another only after all 8 participants had
observed the history of trades and prices, and had clicked on an ￿OK￿
button.
7. At the end of the round, after the decisions of all the 8 traders were
executed, the realization of the asset value was revealed and each sub-
ject saw his own payo⁄ for that round on the screen. The payo⁄s were
computed as follows: if he had bought, the subject obtained v ￿ pt of
a ￿ctitious experimental currency called ￿lira;￿if he had sold, he ob-
tained pt￿v lire; ￿nally, if he decided not to trade he earned (and lost)
nothing. After participants had observed their payo⁄s and clicked on
an OK button, the software moved to the next round.
As should be clear from this description, compared to the existing exper-
imental literature on informational cascades, we introduced the procedural
novelty of a strategy-like method. This has the advantage that we could de-
tect cascade behavior directly. A subject engages in cascade behavior when
he makes the same decision, independently of his signal realization. Since in
our experiment a subject made a decision for each possible signal realization,
we could directly observe whether he chose the same action for both signal
realizations.15 Furthermore, with this method, we collect much more infor-
mation on the subjects￿decision process than with the traditional procedures
15In the existing experimental literature, instead, cascade behavior is typically detected
by focusing on the decisions of subjects when they receive a signal against the history of
trades. The reason is that, in almost all the existing experiments, subjects ￿rst receive
the signal and then are asked to make a decision. An important exception is ˙elen and
Kariv (2004), who employ continuous action and signal spaces to distinguish informational
cascades from herd behavior in a non-market experiment.
14used in informational cascades experiments (in which a subject is ￿rst chosen
to trade, then receives a signal and ￿nally makes a decision). Indeed, in each
treatment, we observed on average 36 decisions per subject, instead of just
7 (one per round). At the same time, our procedure was easy to implement
and was quite natural for ￿nancial market professionals, since they are used
to the idea of a conditional market order that is not necessarily executed.16
At the end of the experiment, we summed up the per round payo⁄s of both
treatments and converted them into pounds at the rate of 3 lire per pound.
With this exchange rate the incentives were clearly much stronger than in
most experiments. In addition, we gave subjects $70 just for participating in
the experiment.17 On average, subjects earned $134 (approximately equal to
$263 and e196) for a 2:5 hour experiment. The minimum payment amounted
to $38 while the maximum was $268, with a standard deviation equal to
$44.18
Finally, before leaving, subjects ￿lled out a short questionnaire, in which
they reported some personal characteristics (gender, age, education, work
position, job tenure) and described their strategy and their beliefs on other
subjects￿strategy in the experiment. Immediately after completing the ques-
tionnaire, subjects were paid in private and could leave the laboratory.19
3.2. Experimental design: the two treatments
As we mentioned before, the di⁄erence between the two treatments is in
the price-updating rule. In Treatment I, we implemented the model without
16Note that the procedure that we employ is not identical to the strategy method. With
a strategy method, we should have asked each participant to make a decision for each
possible contingency. Since there is a very large number of histories of trades, this would
have been impossible to implement. In contrast, our method allowed us to collect a large
dataset while, at the same time, keeping the process of trading simple.
17The ￿xed payment was given to make sure that participants did not end up with
losses.
18We could have used the lottery method to pay our subjects in order to try to control
for risk preferences. Since previous experimental work by Drehman et al (2005) has found
that using the lottery method does not produce signi￿cantly di⁄erent results in this type
of experiment, we have preferred to use the more natural and simple way of computing
payo⁄s.
19In design the experiment and the questionnaire we made sure to maintain subjects￿
anonymity. In particular, we made clear that the procedures were such that we would
not be able to link each individual performance to a name or to a subject￿ s institution.
Moreover, in the experiment it was impossible to know the identity of each subject in the
sequence.
15event uncertainty described in Section 2 (i.e., the parametrization with p = 1
and ￿ = 1). In Treatment II, we implemented instead the model with
uncertainty about the informational event (i.e., with p = 0:85 and ￿ = 0:95).
In Treatment I there is always an information event, whereas in Treat-
ment II an information event occurs with probability 0:95. Nevertheless, in
Treatment II we ran the experiment assuming that an information event had
occurred. Therefore, from the participants￿viewpoint, the main di⁄erence
between the two treatments was how the price was updated for a given order
￿ ow.
Let us illustrate how we update the price. As explained in the previous
section, the market maker sets only one price.20 According to the theory, in
Treatment I in equilibrium subjects should always follow their signal, i.e.,
they should buy after seeing a white signal and sell after seeing a blue one.
No one should decide not to trade, as private information allows the traders
to make pro￿ts by trading with the market maker. Therefore, when a subject
decides to buy, the price is updated assuming that he has seen a good signal.
Similarly, when a subject decides to sell, the price is updated assuming that
the subject has observed a bad signal. Finally, in the case of a no trade,
the price is kept constant. As a result, in this treatment, the price moves
through a grid. It starts at time 1 at the unconditional expected value of 50.
After a sequence of buys, it moves, according to Bayesian updating, through
a sequence of values 70, 84, 93, 97, 99, .... Similarly, after a sequence of sell
orders, it moves through a sequence of values 30, 16, 7, 3, 1, .... The price
at each time t only depends on the trade imbalance, i.e., on the di⁄erence
between the number of buy and sell orders observed up until the previous
period t ￿ 1.
In Treatment II, we change the price updating rule, following the the-
oretical model with event uncertainty. We implement the treatment in the
laboratory by explaining to the subjects that, in the second part of the ex-
periment, the market maker will update the price as if, with high probability,
he were trading not with informed traders, but with noise traders.21 As in
20Allowing the market maker to set only one price makes the experiment easier to run. In
their experiment with student subjects, Cipriani and Guarino (2005) compare the results
of a treatment with only one price set by an automaton (as in this paper) and a treatment
where subjects acting as market makers were allowed to post bid and ask prices. They
￿nd that the results are not a⁄ected by the presence of the bid-ask spread.
21Another di⁄erence between the parameterization of the ￿rst and the second treatment,
is that, in the second treatment, there were 5% of noise traders. We implemented this in
16the previous treatment, participants can observe the amount by which the
computer updated the price before they made their decisions. Therefore,
they have all the information needed to maximize their payo⁄s. Figures 1
and 2 show the price movement after a sequence of 8 buy and 8 sell or-
ders. We have already commented on Figure 1 in the previous section. Let
us focus on Figure 2 here. After the sell orders the price decreases, but
less than in Treatment I. As a result, subjects should follow the signal in
the ￿rst two periods but then they should sell independently of the signal
(herding on the previous actions) in periods 3 to 6. At time 7 the price is
low enough that subjects should now sell only conditional on a blue signal
(and buy conditional on a white one). Figure 3 o⁄ers another example of
the price changes, following a sale at time 1 and a series of buy orders later
on. In this case subjects should herd only starting at time 6, whereas they
should follow their signals at the ￿rst 5 times. Note, that, as in Treatment
I, the price is updated assuming that traders choose the optimal action, i.e.,
they follow their private information when their expectation conditional on
a white (blue) signal is above (below) the market price, and they buy (sell)
irrespective of their signal when we are in a herd buy (herd sell) period.
3.3. The pool of participants
The study was conducted with 32 ￿nancial professionals employed in 13
di⁄erent ￿nancial institutions, all operating in London. Out of the 32 par-
ticipants, 28% were traders, 47% market analysts, 9% sale or investment
the laboratory by having a 3:3% probability in each trading period of a wrongly executing
trading order (e.g., with a 3:3% probability a sell or a no trade was executed, although the
true order coming from the participant was a buy). This is equivalent to saying that there
was a 5% probability that in each period the trade was coming from a ￿noise trader.￿The
presence of noise traders in the second treatment was necessary for the following reason.
Suppose that at time t a rational subject should always buy (because we are in a herd
buy period). If the subject chosen to trade decides to sell, in the absence of noise traders,
the market maker would infer that the market is uninformed, i.e., that all traders are
noise traders. The market maker would, therefore, set the price equal to 50 for the entire
round. Having a proportion of noise traders when there is an information event prevents
this from happening. Also recall that, in the parameterization of the second treatment,
the probability of a noise trader deciding not to trade di⁄ers according to whether an
information event has occurred or not (33% and 2% respectively). This is tantamount to
imposing that no trades do not convey information on the likelihood of an information
event to the market maker and, as a result, the Bayesian updating rule implies no change
in the price after a no trade (as also happens in the ￿rst treatment), which is a natural
and desirable feature.
17management persons, 9% investment bankers and 6% managers.22 84% of
subjects were male and 16% female. The participants￿ages ranged between
21 and 40 years, with a mean equal to 28 years and a standard deviation equal
to 4:9. The average job tenure was 4 years, with a range between 3 months
and 16 years (standard deviation: 4:2). Finally, 8% of participants had a
Ph.D., 61% an M.A./M.S. and 31% a B.A./B.S. Most participants (68%) with
a B.A./B.S. degree had studied economics/￿nance/business; by contrast, the
Masters degrees were split almost equally between economics/￿nance/business
and scienti￿c or technical disciplines such as physics, mathematics or engi-
neering; ￿nally, the Ph.D. degrees were in physics or computer science.
4. Results: Rationality, Herding and Contrarian Be-
havior
We now turn to discuss the results of the experiment. For expositional
reasons, we ￿nd it convenient to present ￿rst the results of Treatment I and
then (in Section 4:2) to illustrate those of Treatment II.
4.1. Treatment I
Table 1 breaks down the participants￿decisions in Treatment I according
to how they used their own private information. In 45:7% of the cases,
subjects just followed their private signal, buying on a white signal, and
selling on a blue one. Recall that this is the rational behavior that theory
predicts in equilibrium.23 In 19:6% of the cases, instead, they followed one
of the two signals, but preferred to abstain from trading conditional on the
other. In 19% of the cases, they decided to disregard private information and
buy or sell conditional on both signals, i.e., they engaged in cascade trading
behavior. In 12:3% of the cases, instead, subjects preferred not to trade
independently of their private information, i.e., they engaged in cascade no-
trading behavior. Finally, there are few cases (3:4%) in which subjects made
decisions that are self-contradictory for any possible belief.24
22We use ￿investment banking￿in its stricter meaning, as one of ￿nancial institutions￿
core functions. Moreover, ￿analyst￿refers to the function within the institution and not
to the rank.
23Following one￿ s private information is rational only if each subject believes that all
his predecessors are rational, that all his predecessors believe that their predecessors are
rational and so on. Furthermore, after a no trade decision, which is always o⁄ the equi-
librium path, subjects should not update their beliefs (which is consistent with our price
updating rule), should believe that their predecesors did not update their beliefs, and so
18Decision
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Table 1: Average behavior in Treatment I.
This aggregate behavior clearly shows that whereas the theory captures
some of the trading rules that subjects used in the laboratory, there are some
departures from the equilibrium predictions that must be explained.25 First,
we must understand why subjects sometimes decided to engage in cascade
behavior and trade independently of the signal. One possibility is that a sub-
ject may neglect private information to herd. As we mentioned in Section 2,
according to the theory, herding should not occur in this treatment. Subjects
in the laboratory, however, may give more weight to public information (i.e.,
the history of trades) than our price updating rule does and believe that
conditioning the trade on the private signal is not optimal when the order
￿ ow already shows evidence in favor of the asset value being high or low.
A second possibility is that a subject may decide to act as a ￿contrarian￿
by going against the market. This behavior should not occur in equilibrium
either, but a subject may use the strategy of going against the market to sell
at a high price and buy at a low one.
Table 2 shows how cascade trading behavior evolved according to the
absolute value of the trade imbalance, i.e., the absolute value of the di⁄erence
in the number of buy and sell orders. There is a monotonic increase in
on.
24For instance, we observed some decisions to sell conditional on a white signal, but not
to trade conditional on a blue signal, which can only be interpreted as a mistake since a
white signal always conveys more positive information about the asset value than a blue
one.
25Note that the results in Table 1 overweigh decisions taken in the ￿rst periods (when all
subjects take a decision) with respect to those taken at later periods (when fewer subjects
do so). This implies that the results overweigh decisions taken when the trade imbalance is
0 with respect to those taken when the trade imbalance is high. In the following analysis,
we will control for this, by studying the decisions taken conditional on a given level of the
trade imbalance.
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1 18:5% 5:7% 12:9%
2 42:7% 16:1% 26:6%
3 54:3% 23:9% 30:4%
￿ 4 62:5% 21:9% 40:6%
Table 2: Cascade trading behavior in Treatment I.
the proportion of cascade-trading decisions as the trade imbalance increases:
when the trade imbalance is 0, cascade trading behavior accounts for less
than 6% of decisions; for an absolute value of the trade imbalance of 3 or
more, instead, it accounts for more than 50% of decisions.
Note that, when the trade imbalance is 0, we cannot classify cascade
behavior as herding or contrarianism. In such a case the number of buy and
sell orders is identical, and the price is equal to the unconditional expected
value of 50. Therefore, the subjects￿decisions to buy or sell independently of
the signal cannot be explained either in terms of following the crowd or going
against it. By contrast, when the absolute value of the trade imbalance is at
least 1 we can distinguish between herd and contrarian behavior as explained
in Section 2.
As Table 2 shows, the evolution of herding and contrarianism with the
trade imbalance is quite di⁄erent. When the absolute value of the trade
imbalance increases, so does the evidence in favor of the asset value being
0 or 100. This could have induced subjects to follow more and more the
predecessors￿decisions. As a matter of fact, herding almost triples when
the imbalance goes from 1 to 2, but then it stabilizes at a level close to
20%. Contrarianism, instead, increases monotonically and by a substantial
amount with the trade imbalance and accounts for a large percentage (40%)
of all decisions when the trade imbalance is high (at least 4). Overall, our
experiment seems to indicate that, with no event uncertainty, subjects do not
have a strong tendency to herd. In contrast, they do have a strong tendency
to behave as contrarians.26
26Our results on herding and contrarianism are further con￿rmed when one looks at the
decisions to follow one of the two signals only (and not to trade conditional on the other).
The ￿gure reported in Table 1 (19:6%) results from two di⁄erent types of behavior: the
20One could wonder whether the observed deviations from the theory can
be explained by the fact that subjects deciding in later periods may factor
in the possibility of errors by their predecessors. If a subject factors in the
possibility of errors by his predecessors, his optimal trading decision can
change. As is now standard in the experimental literature, we answer this
question through an analysis of errors. We estimated the error rates assuming
that expected payo⁄s are subject to shocks distributed independently as a
logistic random variable (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). At each time
t, the probability of an action is a function of the di⁄erence between the










where j = 0;1;2 indicates a no trade, a buy or a sell order, respectively.27
The model implies that a subject may not choose the action that yields
the highest payo⁄, i.e., that he may make a mistake. For each period of
trading, we estimated the parameters of the model by regressing all trading
decisions up to that period across subjects and rounds on ￿t. The analysis




the expected payo⁄s at time t. In other words, when computing a subject￿ s
expected payo⁄ at time t, we assume that the subject incorporates in his
expectations the likelihood that his predecessors have made mistakes.
By using this model, we can explain a proportion of contrarianism. In
particular, when the absolute trade imbalance is equal to or higher than 4, all
the contrarianism that we ￿nd in the data can be considered rational. Con-
trarianism at lower levels of the absolute trade imbalance, however, remains
a non-rational behavior, even if one takes into account previous subjects￿
decision to follow the signal that agrees with the trade imbalance (e.g., the white signal
after more buys than sells) and not to trade conditional on the signal at odds with it; and
the decision to follow the signal that is at odds with the trade imbalance (e.g., the blue
signal after more buys than sells) and not to trade conditional on the one that agrees with
it. Interestingly, this latter type of behavior is more frequent (11:5%) than the former
(6:6%), indicating, again, that subjects had a higher tendency to go against the market
than to follow it.
27The expected payo⁄ of a no trade does not enter the model, since it is constant for all
times t.
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Table 3: No trade in Treatment I.
mistakes.28
We will discuss individual behavior in detail in Section V . Here, however,
it is worth noting that there was signi￿cant heterogeneity in the decision to
herd, with the vast majority of subjects never herding. As a matter of fact,
24 out of the overall 39 decisions to herd for an absolute trade imbalance
of at least 2 (i.e., 62% of these decisions) are due to two subjects only. If
we exclude these two subjects, the percentage of herding becomes very low
(only 8% of decisions taken for an absolute trade imbalance of at least 2).
The results also show signi￿cant heterogeneity in the degree of contrarianism,
with slightly more than half of the subjects never acting as contrarians. In
contrast to herding, however, the overall proportion of contrarian decisions
is not a⁄ected by the behavior of only few subjects.
Now, let us look at the decision of subjects not to participate in the
market, i.e., the decision not to trade independently of the signal (cascade
no trading).
Cascade no trading occurred mainly under two circumstances: when the
trade imbalance was 0 and when it was high (greater than or equal to 3). A
trade imbalance of 0 means that either no one has yet traded in the mar-
ket or that the order ￿ ow has not taken any particular direction. In such
circumstances, subjects have sometimes used the strategy of not taking a
trading position, opting for trading only when the market has already taken
a direction. For strictly positive levels of the absolute trade imbalance, the
level of no trade is then monotonically increasing. It is worth recalling that
a higher level of the trade imbalance is equivalent to a price farther away
from the unconditional expected value. Therefore, a higher trade imbalance
28Similarly, the modest proportion of herding remains not rational even taking into
account the errors in the laboratory.
22also meant that the possible loss (i.e., buying when the fundamental was 0
or selling when it was 100) was higher. The higher this potential loss, the
lower was the participation in the market.
4.2. Treatment II
Let us now analyze subjects￿decisions in Treatment II. Recall that the
theoretical predictions for this treatment are di⁄erent from those of Treat-
ment I. In particular, in Treatment II, it is no longer the case that sub-
jects should always follow their private information. After a given history
of trades, it is possible that the optimal decision for a rational trader is to
buy irrespective of the signal (herd buy periods) or to sell irrespective of the
signal (herd sell periods). Table 4 breaks down the participants￿decisions in
Treatment II according to how they used their own private information. In
51% of the cases, subjects followed their private signal, buying on a white
signal, and selling on a blue one. Whereas in Treatment I the proportion
of decisions in accordance with private information is also a measure of how
the participants￿strategies agreed with the theoretical predictions, this is no
longer the case now. For this reason, we also computed the percentage of
times in which the participants￿strategies agreed with the theoretical pre-
diction: such a percentage is 48, almost identical to that of Treatment I.29
As for the other ￿gures reported in Table 4, it is worth noting that there is
slightly less cascade trading behavior than what was reported in Table 1 and
slightly more cascade no trading behavior. The strategy of following one of
the two signals and not trading on the other was chosen almost the same
percentage of times as in Treatment I.
The di⁄erence between the behavior in the two treatments becomes strik-
ing when one contrasts Table 5 with Table 2. In contrast with the previous
treatment, contrarianism is now very modest. It does not increase at all with
the trade imbalance and remains always at an almost negligible level. On the
other hand, herd behavior is steadily increasing with the trade imbalance.
For a trade imbalance of at least 4, herd behavior explains all cascade trad-
ing behavior; it amounts to 40% of all decisions taken for such levels of the
imbalance. The di⁄erent propensity to herd with respect to Treatment I can
easily be appreciated by noting that in that treatment, even for the highest
levels of the trade imbalance, herd behavior was around 20%, a relatively
29In other words, this is the percentage of the time in which subjects followed the signals
when theory prescribes to follow the signal and herded when the theory prescribes to do
so. Of course, the same remark as in footnote 23 applies to this computation.
23Decision
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Table 4: Average behavior in Treatment II.
Absolute Value








1 8:2% 4:4% 3:8%
2 23% 18:4% 4:6%
3 34:3% 30:3% 4:0%
￿ 4 40:4% 40:4% 0:0%
Table 5: Cascade trading behavior in Treatment II
low increment from the 5:8% of cascade behavior when the trade imbalance
was 0. In the present treatment, instead, cascade behavior is only 2:2% for
a trade imbalance of 0 but jumps to 40:4% (all due to herding) for a trade
imbalance higher than 3. Therefore, we can conclude that the theory cor-
rectly predicts the higher level of herding in this treatment with respect to
the previous one.30
The level of herding observed in the laboratory, however, is lower than
what the theory predicts. We computed the percentage of herd behavior
in the periods in which herding is theoretically rational.31 The result is
that herding occurred in only 23% of the cases.32 Since this type of ￿nancial
30Another signi￿cant di⁄erence with respect to Treatment I, is that here, when partic-
ipants followed only one signal and did not trade conditional on the other, they mainly
followed the signal that agreed with the trade imbalance. In fact, this behavior accounts
for 16:9% of subjects￿ decisions, out of the 19:6% of cases in which subjects followed only
one signal (and decided not to trade for the other). This contrasts with what was observed
in footnote 26 for Treatment I, i.e., that, when agents decided to follow only one signal,
they mainly did so for the signal that did not agree with the trade imbalance.
31The same remark as in footnote 22 applies to this computation too.
32Note, however, that if we take into account previous subjects￿mistakes through an
24market has never been tested previously in the laboratory, we cannot compare
our results to those of other studies, not even to experiments conducted
with students. The closest study is the ￿￿xed price treatment￿presented
in Cipriani and Guarino (2005). In that treatment, subjects (undergraduate
students) had three options, as in the present context, and the price was
always set equal to the unconditional expected value of 50. Subjects engaged
in herd behavior 50% of the time. The di⁄erence may well be due to the
fact that here there is price movement, although it is less pronounced than
in the previous treatment; this may have induced subjects to disregard the
previous history of trades even in cases where doing so was not optimal. Our
low level of herding, however, is also reminiscent of the results by Alevy et al.
(2007), according to whom ￿nancial professionals put more weight on private
information than students do and are less inclined to follow predecessors.
In summary, we can draw two conclusions on herding and contrarianism.
First, whereas in Treatment I we observe a signi￿cant deviation from the the-
ory because of contrarian behavior, this does not happen in Treatment II,
where as the theory predicts contrarianism is not present. Second, the com-
parison between the experimental results in the two treatments supports the
theoretical prediction that informational uncertainty is a source of herding
behavior. In particular, in Treatment II, herd behavior occurs, especially
for high values of the trade imbalance, and occurs more often than what
we observe in Treatment I. The level of herding observed in Treatment II,
however, is lower than what theory predicts.
Another signi￿cant di⁄erence between the two treatments emerges when
we look at the decisions not to trade. As Table 6 shows, in Treatment II,
cascade no trading is monotonically and sharply decreasing with the absolute
value of the trade imbalance. Subjects decided not to participate in the
market mainly for a trade imbalance of 0. To explain such a behavior it
is worth recalling that in this treatment, even for a high level of the trade
imbalance, the price never reached values close to the extremes (0 or 100) and,
as a result, the maximum loss was never very high. A high trade imbalance
revealed information on the asset value, without making the maximum loss
too high. For a high value of the imbalance, when subjects wanted to use
the option of not trading, they typically preferred to do so conditional on
one signal only (the signal at odds with the trade imbalance) than to do so
analysis of errors, the proportion of decisions in which traders correctly decided to herd
increases to 31%.
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Table 6: No trade in Treatment II.
conditional on both.
5. Comparison with Previous Experimental Results
As we mentioned in the Introduction, Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and
Drehman et al. (2005) have run experiments similar to our Treatment I with
a di⁄erent pool of subjects. It is useful to compare their results to ours.
Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and Drehman et al. (2005) reach similar
conclusions: subjects have a modest propensity to herd; at the same time,
there are deviations from the equilibrium predictions in terms of abstention
from trading and of contrarian behavior. Our ￿rst treatment is very similar
to Cipriani and Guarino￿ s (2005) ￿Flexible Price Treatment￿(CG-FPT from
now on), since the parameter values chosen to implement the experiment are
the same. This makes the comparison with that study particularly easy. The
main di⁄erence between Treatment I and CG-FPT is that, whereas we used
a strategy-like method, in CG-FPT each subject made only one decision
per round, after observing the signal realization.33 Therefore, comparing
the statistics we have reported in the previous section with those reported
in CG-FPT would not be correct.34 In order to compare our experimental
results with those of CG-FPT, we computed the same statistics as CG-FPT
using our dataset (e.g., we computed the proportion of rational decisions
33Morevoer, CG-FPT was run with paper and pencil and involved 12 subjects instead
of 8.
34Indeed, the di⁄erences in procedures imply that even the de￿nitions of rationality,
herding and contrarianism are di⁄erent. For instance, we classi￿ed an action as rational
when the subject made the correct decision (according to theory) conditional on both
signals. In CG-FPT, instead, since subjects made a decision after observing the signal,
rationality meant that the decision taken was correct given the observed signal. Clearly,
the de￿nition of rationality in this paper is stricter than that in CG-FPT.
26only considering those decisions that were actually executed, which is what
we would have observed had we used the same procedures of that study).
In CG-FPT, the proportion of decisions that were rational, i.e., consistent
with the theory, was 65%. This is the same percentage that we obtain in our
study. The average proportion of no trades was 22% in CG-FPT and 24%
in ours. Cipriani and Guarino (2005) studied herd behavior by analyzing
the subjects￿decisions when they faced a trade imbalance of at least two
(in absolute value) and received a signal against the imbalance. In CG-FPT
subjects decided to neglect their private information and engage in herd
behavior in 12% of the cases; in 42% of the cases they decided not to trade and
in 46% they followed their signal. The corresponding numbers in our study
are 5% for herding, 32% for no trade and 63% for following the signal. Finally,
contrarianism was studied in Cipriani and Guarino (2005) by analyzing the
case in which a subject observed a bad signal and a trade imbalance lower
than or equal to ￿2 or a good signal and a trade imbalance greater than or
equal to 2. Using this criterion, we observed 28% of contrarianism versus
19% in CG-FPT.
It is clear from these numbers that the behavior of ￿nancial market pro-
fessionals is not very dissimilar from that of the undergraduate students used
in Cipriani and Guarino (2005). The similarity of results is reassuring for
previous experimental ￿ndings. Our study con￿rms the low propensity to
herd, and it shows an even more pronounced propensity to go against the
market by ￿nancial professionals. Interestingly, it also shows that abstention
from trading remains an important deviation from the theoretical predictions,
even for ￿nancial professionals.
6. Individual Behavior
In the previous section we characterized the aggregate choices of all the
participants in the experiment. We now turn to discuss whether there is
heterogeneity in individual behavior and its sources. Table 7 classi￿es indi-
viduals depending on the percentage of time in which their decisions agreed
with the theoretical ones.
The table clearly shows that in both treatments participants behaved
quite di⁄erently. For instance, in both treatments there are almost 10%
of subjects who made the theoretically optimal decision more than 80% of
the time; on the other hand, there are approximately 20% of subjects who
made the theoretically optimal decision less than 20% of the time. It is
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0 ￿ 20 18:7 25:0
21 ￿ 40 21:9 12:5
41 ￿ 60 31:3 18:8
61 ￿ 80 18:8 34:4
81 ￿ 100 9:4 9:4
Table 7: Percentage of decisions in accordance with the theoretical prediction
at individual level.
worth studying whether such heterogenous behavior can be related to the
participants￿characteristics.
At the end of the experiment we collected information on the participants￿
age, gender, education, job tenure and job position. Table 8 shows the re-
sults of regressing the proportion of decisions taken in accordance to theory
for each participant against the participants￿age, education, gender and a
dummy for traders.35 Only the participants￿age has a statistically signi￿-
cant and positive e⁄ect. The subjects￿level of education, gender and being
an actual trader are not signi￿cant determinants of the level of rationality.36
Participants showed heterogeneity also in the speci￿c trading strategies
discussed in the previous sections (i.e., propensity to herd and act as contrari-
ans). For instance, as already mentioned before, in Treatment I only very few
subjects engaged often in herd behavior, whereas many never did.37 Through
regression analysis, we have studied whether the participants￿propensity to
herd or act as a contrarian is a⁄ected by their personal characteristics. None
of the characteristics that we analyzed had a signi￿cant impact, except gen-
der: women made signi￿cantly fewer contrarian decisions in the ￿rst treat-
ment and more herd decisions in the second treatment.38
35The variable education takes value 1 if the participant￿ s highest degree of education
is a BA./BSc, 2 for an MA/MSc and 3 for a PhD. The dummy variable for trader takes
value 1 if the participant was a trader and 0 if otherwise.
36We also used the job tenure as a regressor, instead of age and obtained similar results.
Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow to disentangle which of these two (collinear)
variables has an e⁄ect on rationality. If we include both age and job tenure as regressors,
both coe¢ cients become not signi￿cant.
37For an absolute trade imbalance of at least 2, 66% of participants never herded.
38In the interest of space, we do not report the regression results, since most of the





















Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0:00 0:09 0:129 0:053 0:279
Table 8: Regressions of the level of rationality in the experiment on individual
characteristics. P-values in parenthesis.
Table 9 shows the relationship between a subject￿ s payo⁄and his personal
characteristics. Traders earned signi￿cantly more than the other participants.
No other characteristics signi￿cantly a⁄ected the subjects￿payo⁄s. The sig-
ni￿cantly higher payo⁄of traders was due to higher earnings in Treatment I,
whereas no signi￿cant di⁄erence emerged in Treatment II.39 It is, however,
di¢ cult to gauge from the data how traders achieved higher payo⁄s. Indeed,
as Table 10 shows, being a professional trader did not change the tendency
to act as a herder, or a contrarian, or to abstain from trading or to behave
rationally. It appears that professional traders had an ability to earn more
money than the other participants, even though, with respect to herding,
contrarianism and no-trading, their trading strategies do not look di⁄erent.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed cascade and herd behavior in a laboratory
￿nancial market. The main novelty of our experiment is the use of a sample of
￿nancial market professionals, instead of college undergraduates. Moreover,
with respect to the existing literature, we have introduced a new experimental
design, akin to the strategy method. In the experiment, subjects make a
conditional order, contingent on any signal realization, instead of choosing
an action after observing a realization. With this method we are able to elicit
coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant.
39The p-values of the per-treatment regressions (which, in the interest of space, we do
not report) are 0:06 and 0:23 respectively.





















Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0:00 0:02 0:001 0:054 0:080
Table 9: Regression of subjects￿payo⁄ at the end of the experiment on
individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)












Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0:147 0:121 0:021 0:007 0:002
Table 10: Regressions of participants￿proportion of herding, contrarianism
and no trading on the trader￿ s dummy. Herd 1 and Contrarian 1 refer to
Treatment I. Herd 2 and Contrarian 2 refer to Treatment II. P-values in
parenthesis.
30beliefs and detect cascade behavior directly (whereas in previous experiments
it could only be inferred indirectly).
We have run two treatments. In Treatment I the price adjusts to the
order ￿ ow in such a way that subjects should simply follow their own private
information. In Treatment II, because of event uncertainty, the price does
not fully re￿ ect the information contained in the order ￿ ow and, as a result,
it is sometimes rational for subjects to neglect the private information and
imitate the predecessors. This is the ￿rst study where herding in ￿nancial
markets with event uncertainty is tested in the laboratory.
In the ￿rst treatment, with no event uncertainty, agents rarely herded,
which is consistent with the theory. At the same time, two anomalies emerged.
First, subjects had a tendency to go against the market (contrarian behav-
ior) which the theory does not predict. Second, they sometimes preferred to
abstain from trading although they had an informational advantage over the
market maker. The results of this ￿rst treatment are in line with previous
experimental evidence on student subjects.
In the second treatment, with event uncertainty, the proportion of herd
behavior increased with respect to the ￿rst treatment, as predicted by the
theory. At the same time, such a proportion was lower than the equilibrium
prediction. Contrarian behavior disappeared altogether in this treatment,
whereas the decision not to trade was observed often, as in the case of no
event uncertainty.
Our study combines the advantage of the controlled experiment with that
of observing the behavior of professionals, who are engaged in the day-by-
day activity of trading, pricing and analyzing ￿nancial assets. We believe
that the challenge for future research is twofold. On the one hand, the
existing experimental results o⁄er suggestions for research with ￿eld data,
which should study whether the behaviors observed in the laboratory are
present in actual ￿nancial markets; on the other hand, more theoretical work
is needed to capture the behavior that the present model is unable to predict,
such as contrarianism and abstention from trading activity.
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